"Cohabitation:
the Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown".
3.24
We invite the views of consultees on whether any legislative
definition of those eligible to apply as cohabitants for
financial relief on separation should be expressed by
analogy to marriage and civil partnership, or in other
terms.
We
do not agree with the notions that mere cohabitees should
ever inherit except where the deceased has expressly stated
a desire.
We
disagree for the same reason that we object to the notion
of an ‘associated person’ and the gifting
of any rights to a false legal personality.
The
French have a ‘tiered’ approach of concubinage,
unions (PaCS), and marriage, and if the Commission is
stubborn in wishing to adopt some sort of approach we
would suggest that is the least offensive.
For
more details see preceding chapters.
3.30
We provisionally propose that any legislative definition
of those eligible to apply should expressly require that
the parties shared a joint household. Do consultees agree?
No.
We do not support any such legislation and therefore object
to drafting any eligibility code.
3.31
We provisionally propose that any legislative definition
of those eligible to apply should include an express,
non-exhaustive checklist of factors to which the court
would have regard in determining whether a couple were
cohabiting. Do consultees agree?
No.
The idea is wrong headed. Check lists become warped over
time and abused in use, e.g. Children Act 1989. It is
no business of the state, let alone courts, to busy themselves
determining whether a couple is or was cohabiting, or
not.
3.32
We invite the views of consultees on the factors that
they consider should be included in such a statutory checklist.
We
refuse to participate in any statutory checklist. The
idea displays a lack of understanding.
The
property belongs to the owner and should be used, and
under the control of, the owner.
It
should not be gifted to transient persons who may enter
and leave the owner’s life.
Following
this course the Commission will be making the same sort
of mistakes it did when Deech and Hoggett held sway.
The
Commission have forgotten what ‘jurisprudence’
is and its purpose.
There
is a reason why ‘hard cases make bad law’.
3.52
We consider that cohabitants who are by law the parents
of a child born before, during or following their cohabitation
ought to be automatically eligible to apply for remedies
under any new scheme on separation. Do consultees agree
?
No.
It is already an assumed responsibility freely and willingly
entered into by many fathers – we presume that is
what you are trying to refer to - so there is no need
to impose it by law.
The
only person entitled to inherit from such a union must
be the child via a will, i.e. via the express wishes of
the owner (dead or alive) – not the court making
assumptions that may be one thing and one result today
but quite different result in, say, 7 years time.
If
you want parents of a child to be automatically eligible
to apply for remedies, i.e. property, then it must be
confined to married couples.
To
do otherwise is to risk going back to the era of ‘irregular
marriages’.
Couples
who cohabit do so for a reason. The Commission’s
’nanny state’ proposals would take away that
reason.
The
only reason we might be convinced to change our mind and
agree to an ‘automatic eligibility to apply for
remedies’ would be if fathers were automaticly eligible
for sole custody of the children.
This
would seem a good exchange in the apportionment of children
and house.
3.53
We invite the views of consultees on whether cohabitants
with a child, who is not the child by law of both parties
ought to be eligible regardless of the length of their
relationship and, if so, in what circumstances.
No.
To ask this question is to publicly declare that the Commission
has lost its moral compass and has not got a clue as to
what the upshot will be of enforcing such a regime after,
say, 30 or 40 years.
This
is small-mind thinking and the Commission ought to have
some idea what the result will be and what it expects
that the social landscape will look like.
Why
does the Commission want to reward low personal standards,
poor self judgement, low product quality (resultant child)
and reinforce failure when a superior product is available,
is efficient, and is fit for purpose ?
The
Commission has a 40 year long track record of mistaken
meddling; using that experience it ought to be able to
predict what will not be achieved once the Law Commission
has made its view known - even if it has always been impossible
for it to correctly predict what its own actions would
bring.
3.54
We invite the views of consultees on:
(1)
whether parties who do not have a relevant child should
have lived together as cohabitants for a specified minimum
duration before they are eligible to apply for financial
relief on separation (“a minimum duration requirement”);
(2)
how any such minimum duration requirement should be selected;
and
(3)
how long any such minimum duration requirement should
be.
(1)
This is the scheme seen in New Zealand. It has yet to
be a). proven to work and not penalise only men (the wealth
creators) and b). proven to work in a population of over
4 million.
(2)
We do not agree with the concept of a minimum duration
so how it is devised is superfluous.
(3)
The idea of a state enforced duration before qualification
could apply more reasonably to other matters far outside
the matrimonial arena. There should be no minimum and
no maximums because there should be none at all.
3.64
We provisionally reject the view that the substantive
law governing financial relief between spouses on divorce
(Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973) should be
extended to cohabitants on separation. Do consultees agree?
For
the divorced male the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is something
of a joke. The reasons – and this would be plain
as a pike staff if courts were open to the public - is
that Courts and judges dip in, take from it only what
they want and leave forgetting the whole Acts intentions.
So
‘Yes’, we agree it should be rejected as it
works vindictively for spouses.
3.66
We provisionally propose that in granting financial relief
to cohabitants on separation, the courts should have available
to them the following menu of orders:
(1)
periodical payments, secured and unsecured;
(2)
lump sum payments, including by instalment;
(3)
property adjustment;
(4)
property settlement;
(5)
orders for sale;
(6)
pension sharing; and
(7)
interim payments ordered on account pending a full trial
or final settlement.
Do
consultees agree?
No.
If the Commission sees nothing wrong with offering a ‘menu
of orders’ for judges and courts why should not
‘a menu’ be offered to the condemned man -
it is after all his property you are proposing to take
off him ?
It
was particularly thoughtless of the Commission to allow
marriages entered into during the 1950 and 1960s to be
divorce under the terms of the 1970 and 1980 laws.
If
the Commission had been honest about what were described
in 1968 as ‘bottlenecks due to illicit union’
then a temporary “Special Measures” Stat Inst
would have remedied the problem.
3.75
We provisionally reject the view that any new scheme should
take effect by reference to fixed rules for property division.
Instead, we provisionally propose that the courts should
exercise a discretion structured by principles which determine
the basis on which relief, if any, is to be granted on
separation. Do consultees agree?
No.
Even if we agreed with the original premise, of property
confiscation, what question 3.75 contains is an ignorance
of ‘certainty’.
Any
1st year student of matrimonial law could tell you that
a). the use of discretion was a disaster as it permits
no predictability and judges can never get it wrong, and
b). “There is not law in family law”.
If
you cannot guess what havoc such an idea might bring,
we would be wasting our breath trying to tell you.
3.137
We invite the views of consultees on the principles which
should justify and quantify awards of financial relief
between cohabitants on separation.
There
should be none at all.
If
any measure shadowing the Commission’s 2002 or 2006
proposal are adapted the longer term decline in wealth
creation, tax raising revenues and industrial predictability
will flow.
We
will have a transfixed economy slowly sliding into decline
and relative poverty similar to that presently seen in
Japan.
3.138
We consider that the mere fact that one party has financial
or other material needs should not in itself justify the
grant of financial relief from the other party on separation.
Do consultees agree?
Yes.
The doctrine that ownership cannot be compromised should
be adhered to and reinforced. We believe this because
it makes understanding for ordinary folk that much quicker
and simpler to grasp. It avoids false hopes and disappointment
For
an example of how not to design something look at our
‘Benefits’ system where some (who know the
system works) can make extraordinary gains while others
withers in wintry coldness.
3.139
We consider that, in determining whether to grant relief
and, if so, what the relief should be, the court should
have regard to whether, and to what extent, either party’s
economic position following separation (in terms of capital,
income or earning capacity) was:
(1)
improved by the retention of some economic benefit arising
from contributions made by the other party during the
relationship (“economic advantage”); or
(2)
impaired by economic sacrifices made as a result of that
party’s contributions to the relationship, or as
a result of continuing child care responsibilities following
separation (“economic disadvantage”).
Do
consultees agree?
(1)
This sounds like is a silly idea. It might have been more
normal to expect a division based on community property
but to base it on supposed wealth post-separation seems
faintly absurd. Using a stereotype from the 1930s of Lord
Bosham’s eldest son and heir to the earldom and
Mabel, a chorus girl, how would these proposals benefit
the chorus girl ? Would she be seen as a ‘gold digger’
?
(2)
No, this is crystallising victomhood status in yet another
social sphere. This person, presumably women, freely entered
into the relationship – she was not dragooned. Ignorance
is never a legal defence and if the Commission is now
trying to make it one by saying many young women are ignorant
of the law, then where does the fault lie ? Perhaps in
our schools but certainly not against a cohabitee.
The
economic advantage argument cuts both ways. The party
in the better economic position should be rewarded for
assisting the less well-placed party - not simply penalised
every time. What is never considered by do-gooders is
the value that should be put on the economic advantages
and perks enjoyed by his patronage while they were together
and offset that against notion of alleged economic sacrifices.
3.140
We invite the views of consultees on the factors to which
the court should have regard when considering the justification
for, and quantum of, any financial relief to be granted
in accordance with the principles of economic advantage
and economic disadvantage.
No
financial relief / ex-gratia payment / compensation /
golden handshake / bribe/ pay off, etc, etc should be
granted at all.
3.141
We invite the views of consultees on whether a new scheme
for financial relief between cohabitants should include
a power to make awards in appropriate cases to assist
the party with whom any relevant children will principally
live following separation with the costs of child-care.
The
cost of child-care is bankrupting the country. We predicted
in 1998 that at £12 billion per annum it could not
be viable for very long and any government that tried
to implement it would face severe problems within 4 years.
We also pointed out that any wages earned by the parent,
i.e. the mother, would be swallowed up in nursery fees.
This has now come about.
The
1970s saw government prepared to shoulder the cost of
divorce (Booth Cttee, inter-departmental cttee 1978).
[*]
By
1990 the CSA had to be introduced as government decided
that perhaps it couldn’t afford divorce’s
legal aid bill and child care costs or Benefit costs,
after all.
The
Commission is perhaps forgetting that prior to the Finer
Report 1976, many husbands were committed to prison for
non-payment of child maintenance Twenty years later (1996)
this was still the case except that men were so abused
they began committing suicide. The non-payment of child
maintenance can be traced back to the Commission of 1912.
Like the poor, non--payment will always be with us.
Perhaps
instead of persecuting men, women could be educated into
knowing what, at best and worst, they might expect. This
seems to have been the case in the 18th and 19th centuries
(Robb v Robb).
So
what hope remains for the Commission’s proposals
if maintenance or payments by cohabitees who are less
committed to their female partners and children than spouses
? Is this why the proposals appear to attack static wealth
rather than income streams ?
[*]
After the Booth Cttee's report a fundamental shift in
policy took place in 1979 and. It was accepted by a high
powered Whitehall "inter-departmental working group"
that the State should henceforth shoulder the burden of
divorce and finance single parenthood (see also "Divorce
Matters" Ormrod LJ, et al).
Robert Whiston
October 2006